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[38 C.2d 535; 241 P .2d 253] 
[ L . .A. No. 21826. In Bank. Mar. 3, 1952. J 
CITY OF CULVER CITY et aL, Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR 
COURT OF IjOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent. 
[1] Injunctions-Performance and Enforcement of.-The institu-
tion of litigation, in which Culver City sought a determination 
limiting its liability for the cost of a sewage disposal plant to 
fixed sums already paid under prior contracts with the city of 
Los .Angeles, was not compliance with an injunction requiring 
payment of a proportionate share of the cost of a plant which 
the city of Los .Angeles was ordered to construct, where the 
rulings in the injunction proceeding preserved all rights under 
the prior contracts but required them to be settled in other 
proceedings. 
[2] Contempt-Certiorari-Scope of Review.-.A judgment that 
Culver City and members of its city council are guilty of 
contempt for failure to pay its proportionate share of the 
cost of a new sewage disposal plant will not be annulled in a 
proceeding to review the judgment, where there is a sub-
stantial conflict in the evidence with respect to the city's 
claim that it has done everything it can to comply with the 
injunction. 
[3] !d.-Judgment or Order-Specification of Act.-To comply 
with the requirement of Code Civ. Proc., § 1219, that when 
a person is to be imprisoned for contempt until he performs 
a certain act "the act must be specified in the warrant of com-
mitment," such act must be specified with particularity. 
[4] !d.-Judgment or Order-Recitals.-Judgment that council-
mev of Culver City be imprisoned for contempt until they 
have completed all arrangements necessary for financing the 
city's proportionate share of the cost of a new sewage disposal 
plant according to the gallonage allotted to the city, and 
that they tall:e such action (1) by appropriation of necessary 
funds or levying of a tax or other charge, or (2) by any other 
system, method or plan, or ( 3) by the doing of such things 
as might be necessary for the sale of bonds to provide the 
necessary funds, is not too vague a description of the act 
which the contemnors must do to purge themselves of con-
tempt, and insofar as the specification permits alternative 
methods of compliance, it is to their benefit rather than 
detriment. 
[3] See Cal.Jur., Contempt, § 46; Am.Jur., Contempt, § 78. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Injunctions, § 90.5; [2] Contempt, 
§ 80; [3] Contempt, § 58; [ 4, 5] Contempt, § 59; [ 6, 7] Contempt, 
§ 37. 
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[5] Id.- Judgment or Order- Recitals.- ]'ailure of judgment 
committing Culver City councilmen for contempt to specify 
the precise sums to be paid as the proportionate share 
of the cost of a new sewage dispJsal plant and the dates on 
which they are to be paid is not a fatal defect where there 
is a precise formula for computing such share, based on 
gallonage allotted to the city and the total capacity of the 
plant, and the cost of the plant and the times when the funds 
are required can be determined by consultation with the city 
of Los Angeles, the builder of the new facilities. 
[6] !d.-Nature of Proceeding.-Contempt proceeding against city 
and members of its city council for failure to perform acts 
required by an injunction is not fatally defective for failure 
to advise them whether the proceeding is for criminal or civil 
contempt or both, since in California the proceedings leading 
to punishment for failure to obey a decree (criminal contempt) 
and to imprisonment until the omitted act is performed 
(civil contempt) are exactly the same. (Code Civ. Proc., 
§§ 1209-1219.) 
[7] Id.- Nature of Proceedings.- Although Code Civ. Proc., 
§§ 1209-1219, which provide the procedure for both criminal 
and civil contempt are in part III of that code, which is 
entitled "Special Proceedings of a Civil Nature," contempt 
proceedings are said to be "criminal in nature" and those 
procedural rights and safeguards which are appropriate to 
criminal contempt proceedings are also afforded, in California, 
in civil contempt proceedings. 
PROCEEDING to review a judgment of the Superior Court 
of Los Angeles County holding petitioners in contempt of 
court. Affirmed. 
E. L. Searle for Petitioners. 
Fred N. Howser and Edmund G. Brown, Attorneys Gen-
eral, and Bayard Rhone, Deputy Attorney General, for Re-
spondent. 
SCHAUER, J.-Petitioners, Culver City and the members 
of its city council, seek review and annulment of a judgment 
that they are guilty of contempt for failure to perform acts 
required by the injunction in People v. City of Los Angeles 
(1948), 83 Cal.App.2d 627 [189 P.2d 489]. The relevant 
portions of the injunction and the factual situation which 
led to its issuance are described in the opinion in City of 
[7] See Cal.Jur., Contempt, § 37; Am.Jur., Contempt, § 67. 
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Vernon v. Superior Court, ante, p. 509 [241 P.2d 243]. 
We have concluded that the contempt judgment should be 
affirmed. 
The contempt proceeding was commenced by the filing of 
an affidavit which contained the following allegations: Peti-
tioners have personal knowledge of the terms of the judgment 
and the requirements imposed by it on Culver City. The 
judgment became final on November 12, 1948, after affirm-
ance on petitioners' appeal and denial of their petition for 
certiorari. Culver City intends to dispose of its sewage 
through the new plant built by Los Angeles. Since 1945 Los 
Angeles has attempted ''to work out an arrangement'' with 
Culver City by which the latter could pay its proportionate 
share of the cost of the new plant, but Culver City has re-
fused to do so. On February 14, 1949, the city council au-
thorized institution of an action against Los Angeles to ob-
tain judicial interpretation of agreements with Los Angeles, 
made in 1922 and 1925, which concern disposition of sewage. 
On April 11, 1950, the city council submitted to the electors 
of Culver City a proposed bond issue of $1,250,000 to pay 
for sewage facilities, and the issue was approved by more 
than two thirds of the electors. Petitioners have done nothing 
more to comply with the injunction, although they have the 
ability to comply. 
The reason for Culver City's failure to obtain money for 
its share of the cost of the new plant by selling its bonds 
appears from an answering affidavit of petitioners and from 
the testimony at the contempt hearing. The city cannot sell 
the bonds, it is asserted, because it cannot obtain the opinion 
of a bond attorney that they are marketable. The bonds 
''must be, in the opinion of counsel [the bond attorney], 
valid and binding obligations of the issuing city before a 
marketable opinion can be issued.'' The bond attorney will 
not give a marketable opinion because he is not certain that 
there is a legal obligation of Culver City to Los Angeles 
which would be a basis for issuance and sale of the bonds. 
It appears from the evidence that the bond attorney would 
give a marketable opinion (1) if Culver City would enter 
into a contract to pay Los Angeles its share of the cost ·of 
the new plant pursuant to sections 55110 and 55112 of the 
Government Code, which provide for ''an agreement with 
other local agencies for the joint construction, ownership, or 
nse of sewage treatment plants" and for a bond issue to pay 
the cost of such construction, or (2) if, in the declaratory 
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relief action of Culver City against Los Angeles which was 
authorized by the city council and which is now pending, 
it is determined that Culver City owes Los Angeles a sum 
certain on account of sewage disposal. Culver City urges 
that it has done and is doing, in good faith, everything it 
can to bring about a situation in which the bond attorney 
would give a marketable opinion. 
The evidence as to why Culver City and Los Angeles 
have not entered into a contract pursuant to sections 55110 
and 55112 of the Government Code is conflicting. There is 
testimony of individual petitioners that representatives of 
Los Angeles refused to enter into a new contract unless 
petitioners abandoned their claims under the 1922 and 1925 
contracts. 1 This testimony was not directly denied, but a 
representative of Los Angeles testified that he told the coun-
cil of Culver City that "we were not arguing or deciding 
the merits of the old contracts; Culver City certainly had 
the right to determine that in court whenever they saw fit 
to do so.,, 'l'his latter statement is obviously in accord with 
the rights of the parties as adjudicated in the injunction 
decree. 
[1] In its declaratory relief action against Los Angeles, 
Culver City takes the position that its 1922 and 1925 con-
tracts with Los Angeles obligate Los Angeles to dispose of 
all sewage of Culver City for fixed sums which have already 
been paid, and that Culver City cannot be required to pay 
Los Angeles further sums to aid in defraying the cost of 
a new sewage plant. Argument that the pendency of the 
declaratory relief action in any way shows a bona fide at-
tempt to comply with the injunction decree is but a reiteration 
in a different form of the contention made by Vern on in re-
lation to its contracts with Los Angeles. As in the Vernon 
case it is to be remembered that the basic suit (see p. 648 
of 83 Cal. A pp.2d) "is a proceeding initiated by the . . . State 
of California . . . to abate a public nuisance. Therefore, 
the court rightfully refrained from passing upon any of the 
rights, obligations or liabilities affecting the various de-
fendants by reason of their contractual relations with each 
1Los Angeles had no right to impose such a condition. As the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal stated in its opinion on appeal from the injunction 
decree, ''Insofar as the judgment herein is concerned, if any of the ap-
pellants [including Culver City] have any rights against the city of Los 
Angeles, or vice versa, by 1·eason of any existing contract, such rights 
have been preserved and may be enforced in a proper action.'' (People 
v. City of Los Angeles (1948), supra, 83 Cal.App.2d 627, 648.) 
Mar. 1952] CrTY OF CuLVER CITY v. SuPERIOR CouRT 539 
[38 C.2d 535; 241 P.2d 258] 
other.'' The statement in the opinion of the District Court of 
Appeal that "Insofar as the judgment herein is concerned, 
if any of the appellants [including Culver City] have any 
rights against the city of Los Angeles, or vice versa, by rea-
son of any existing contract, such rights have been preserved 
and may be enforced in a proper action,'' does not mean that 
Culver City, or any other of the injunction defendants, may 
escape complying with the terms of the judgment by institut-
ing further litigation. On the contrary, as declared in Ver-
non (ante, p. 519 [241 P .2d 243]), this ruling preserves 
to petitioners all contractual rights they may possess under 
the mentioned contracts but likewise it requires them to set-
tle or litigate those rights independently of compliance with 
the injunction decree. Culver City's continued reliance on 
its 1922 and 1925 contracts with Los Angeles is, in effect, 
a refusal to abandon contentions which were made and de-
cided against it in the injunction suit. As in Vern on (ante, 
p. 519 [241 P.2d 243] ), the judgment in the basic suit and 
the decision of the District Court of Appeal conclusively 
establish that the bringing of actions upon the old contracts 
is not compliance with the injunction and that such litiga-
ton remains open for determination on its merits, unaffected 
by the injunction decree. (Norris v. Ban Mateo County Title 
Co. (1951), 37 Cal.2d 269, 272 [231 P.2d 493].) 
[2] To negate Culver City's claim that it has done every-
thing it can do to raise money to pay for its share of the 
cost of the new plant, respondent also relies upon evidence 
that other cities were able to make arrangements with Los 
Angeles whereby they issued marketable bonds and upon the 
admitted failure of Culver City to attempt to raise funds 
by tax or assessment. All that can be said in favor of peti-
tioners in respect to the evidence of their asserted good faith 
attempts to comply with the injunction is that there is a sub-
stantial conflict. Since the conflict is substantial and has 
been resolved against petitioners by the trial court, the judg-
ment cannot on that ground be annulled. 
Petitioners also present arguments as to the uncertainty 
of the injunction and the charge of contempt which are 
answered in the opinion in City of Vernon v. Superior Court, 
ante, pp. 513-515 [241 P .2d 243]. They make another conten-
tion which arises out of the same uncertainty as that which, 
it is claimed, inheres in the injunction. [3] It is urged 
that the commitments (quoted 1:nfra) of certain citees are 
void because they do not comply with section 1219 of the 
540 CrrY OF CuLvER CrrY v. SuPERIOR CouRT [38 C.2d 
Code of Civil Procedure. That section provides, "When 
the contempt consists in the omission to perform an act which 
is yet in the power of the person to perform, he may be 
impriRoned until he have performed it, and in that case the 
act rmtst be specified in the warrant of commitment." Italics 
added.) The act must be specified with particularity. (In 
re Wells (1946), 29 Cal.2d 200, 202 [173 P.2d 811]; In re 
Vallindras (1950), 35 Cal.2d 594, 596 [220 P.2d 1].) 
[4] Certain individual citees here are committed "until 
they and all of them have completed all arrangements neces-
sary for the financing of the proportionate share of the city 
of Culver City of said new treatment plant or works, ac-
cording to the gallonage allotted to the city of Culver City, 
and so that said share will be available as required; that they 
take such action (1) by the appropriation of the necessary 
funds as stated in said judgment or the levying of a tax, 
charge, assessment, imposing fee~, tolls, rentals or other 
charges for the raising of the necessary funds, or (2) by any 
other system, method, plan or device, or combination thereof, 
or ( 3) the doing of such things as might be necessary for 
the sale of said bonds and the sale of said bonds to provide 
the means by which said municipal corporation could or might 
raise, accumulate or collect the moneys necessary for the pay-
ment of said city's proportionate share of the cost of con-
struction of the new treatment plant and submarine outfall 
at Hyperion, so that its share might he available as required.'' 
It is urged that the foregoing is too vague a description of 
the act which the citees must do to purge themselves of con-
tempt. Insofar as the specification permits alternative methods 
of compliance, it is to the benefit, rather than the detriment, 
of the petitioners. [5] Nor is the omission to specify the 
precise sums to he paid and the dates on which they are to 
be paid a fatal defect. As in the Vernon case, there is a pre-
cise formula for computing the share of the cost, based upon 
gallonage allotted to the city (a figure which the petitioner 
city itself can specify) and the total capacity of the plant 
(a known figure), and the cost of the plant and the times 
when the funds are required can be determined by consulta-
tion with Los Angeles, which has proceeded with the construc-
tion of the plant despite the failure of some of the other 
parties to the injunction suit to comply with the injunction. 
As also pointed out in the Vernon opinion, the trial court 
in the basic injunction decree expressly reserved jurisdic-
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tion to supervise and settle any disputes which might arise 
in respect to fixing petitioners' share of the costs. 
[6] Petitioners argue at some length concerning the dis-
tinction between civil and criminal contempt. From the be-
ginning of this proceeding petitioners have urged that they 
should be advised whether the proceeding was for criminal 
contempt, civil contempt, or both, and that the proceeding 
is fatally defective because the two types of contempt were 
''scrambled.'' They say, vaguely, that they have been de-
prived of constitutional rights because they were not informed 
whether the contempt proceeding had as its object the punish-
ment of petitioners or the enforcement of the injunction, but 
they suggest no respect in which the failure to so inform 
them affected them adversely or at all. The distinction .be-
tween civil and criminal contempt is important in the fed-
eral and some state courts because there are procedural dif-
ferences, particularly in the safeguards afforded the citee, 
and also, perhaps, differences in the nature of the intent 
which must be shown. (See, e.g., Gompers v. Buck's Stove 
& R. Co. (1911), 221 U.S. 418, 441, 444 et seq. [31 S.Ct. 492, 
55 L.Ed 797]; Garrigan v. United States (1908), 163 F. 16, 
19, 22 [89 C.C.A. 494, 23 L.R.A.N.S. 1295], cert. denied, 214 
U.S. 514 [29 S.Ct. 696, 53 L.Ed. 1063] ; Bigelow v. RKO Radio 
Pictures (1948), 78 F.Supp. 250, 254; State v. Fletcher Tr. 
Co. (1937), 211 Ind. 27, 32, 34 [ 5 N.E.2d 538] ; Root v. Mac-
Donald (1926), 260 Mass. 344, 364 [157 N.E. 684, 54 A.L.R. 
1422]; see, also, Joseph Moskovitz, Contempt of Injunctions 
( 1943), 43 Columb.L.Rev. 780; Comment ( 1950), 48 Mich. 
hRev. 860.) But in California the proceedings leading to 
punishment for failure to obey a decree (criminal contempt) 
and to imprisonment until the omitted act is performed (civil 
contempt) are exactly the same. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1209-
1219; see In re MoTris (1924), 194 Cal. 63, 67 [227 P. 914] .) 
[7] Although the sections which provide the procedure for 
both kinds of contempt are in Part III of the Code of Civil Pro-
erdure, which is entitled "Special Proceedings of a Civil 
Nature,'' contempt proceedings are said to be ''criminal in 
nature'' and those procedural rights and safeguards which 
are appropriate to criminal contempt proceedings are also 
afforded, in Californa, in civil contempt proceedings. (See 
5 Cal.Jur., Contempt, § 37.) Therefore, as in Chas. Cushman 
Co. v. Mackesy (1938), 135 Me. 490, 494 [200 A. 505, 118 
A.L.R. 148], "the distinction is not of importance, for the 
procedure in both cases, in so far as equity decrees are con-
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cerned, is governed by the statutory provisions above men-
tioned.'' 
Arguments as to the undue severity of punishment of the 
individual petitioners are answered in City of Vernon v. 
Superior Court, ante, p. 520 [241 P.2d 243]. 
:B-,or the reasons above stated the judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J. 
pro tem., concurred. 
EDMONDS, J.-For the reasons stated in my concurring 
and dissenting opinion in City of Vernon v. Superior Court, 
ante, p. 520 [241 P.2d 243], I concur in the conclusion that 
the petitioners were guilty of contempt because they did not 
comply with the injunction within the time specified. 
However, the belated ''arrangements'' made by the peti-
tioners to comply with the injunction are even more thorough 
than the action taken by the city of Vernon. Culver City 
has attempted, unsuccessfully, to sell bonds to meet its share 
of the cost of the new plant. Counsel for Culver City will 
not give an opinion as to marketability until its liability is 
determined in a pending declaratory relief action which it 
has brought against the city of Los Angeles. In the alternative, 
such an opinion probably could be secured if Culver City 
would contract with Los Angeles for payment of its share of 
the cost of the Hyperion plant. But the terms of such contract 
also are dependent upon the existing contractual rights of 
the parties. Thus, Culver City has reached an impasse in its 
efforts to comply with the injunction. 
For these reasons, in my opinion, Culver City has made 
all ''arrangements'' necessary to meet its obligations without 
abandoning its rights under existing contracts which are 
specifically preserved by the judgment in the abatement pro-
ceeding. 
I would, therefore, modify the judgment by striking there-
from the order of continuing imprisonment for petitioners 
Thomas J. Carroll, Curtis J. Davis and J. Ray Klots. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent for the same reasons as are set 
forth in my dissenting opinion in City of Vernon v. Superior 
Court, ante, p. 522 [241 P.2d 243], this day filed. 
'l'he opinion was modified to read as above printed and peti-
tioners' application for a rehearing was denied April 2, 1952. 
Carter, J., was of the opinion that the application should be 
granted. 
Mar.1952] HALL v. COYLE 
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[L. A. No. 22152. In Bank. Mar. 7, 1952.] 
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KENNETH W. HALL et al., Respondents, v. WILLIAM 
COYLE et al., Defendants; CLYDE TRUSS, Appellant. 
ll] Judgments- Res Judicata- Proof.- Parol evidence or re-
porter's transcript is admissible to show what matters provable 
under issues of case were submitted in former action as basis 
for determining whether judgment therein is res judicata. 
[2] Id. -Res Judicata- Identity of Causes of Action.- Where 
plaintiffs' house was destroyed by fire when defendants' agent 
was transferring butane gas to plaintiffs' containers, a judg-
ment of nonsuit in action based on alleged obligation of 
defendants to pay money in accordance with an agreement 
compromising a claim for damages for such destruction due 
to the negligent conduct of defendants is not a bar to subse-
quent tort action seeking a recovery on the very claim itself. 
[3] Compromise and Settlement-Claims Compromisable.-Rights 
under an agreement compromising a claim are not dependent 
on the validity of the claim itself. 
[4) Judgments-Res Judicata-Waiver and EstoppeL-Where de-
fendant's attorney, in action on contract, expressly stated 
in his motion for a nonsuit that the action was one on 
the alleged contract, and both the trial judge and oppos-
ing counsel entertained a similar belief, defendant may not, 
in a subsequent tort action brought against him by the same 
plaintiff, reverse his position and declare that the issue of 
negligence was also involved in the first action. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Diego County. L. N. Turrentine, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for damages for destruction of house and its contents 
by fire due to defendants' negligence. Judgment for plaintiffs 
affirmed. 
Raymond F. Feist and Henry F. Walker for Appellant. 
Charles B. Provence and Brooks Crabtree for Respondents. 
[3] See Cal.Jur., Compromise and Settlement, § 7; Am.Jur., 
Compromise and Settlement, § 5. 
[4] See Cal.Jur., Judgments, § 233; Am.Jur., Judgments, § 207. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Judgments, § 445; [2] Judgments, 
§357(2); [3] Compromise and Settlement, §3; [4] Judgments, 
§ 449. 
